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THE CONGRESSIONAL LABOR AGENDA:
NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKES AND
OTHER PROBLEMS IN SEARCH
OF SOLUTION
r. F. CUNNINGHAM*
This is a time of ferment in the thinking of lawyers, politicians,
businessmen, union leaders, and academicians concerning our national
labor law and policy. There is an incipient awareness of some need for
positive changes in the Taft-Hartley Act—for amendments that would
balance the scales of equity in the dealings of labor and management,
without impeding the development of the labor-union movement.'
On the other hand, the federal government's present administration of
the adjudicative machinery established to ensure harmony in labor-
management relations has, at least in the eyes of many, not only lost
its hoped-for salutary impact but, perhaps, any efficacy whatsoever.=
The consequence of these contemporary developments is a state of
disquietude in the labor-relations field. Conceivably, it presages a
broad-based effort to alter the status quo in labor-management affairs.
It is surely a truism to declare that most Americans are relatively
unaware of the substantive content of our national labor laws. Lawyers
are often little better off. For the most part they know that the original
Wagner Act,' enacted over the opposition of many businessmen,' gave
official government sanction to the principle of collective bargaining,
created a National Labor Relations Board, and outlawed certain
objectionable practices of both employers and labor unions. Further,
they have some familiarity with the Taft-Hartley amendments,'
* B.S., John Carroll University, 1957; LL.B., Columbia University, 1960; AM.,
University of Rochester, 1967; Member, District of Columbia Bar; Member, American -
Bar Association; Attorney, Legal Department, E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company,
Wilmington, Delaware.
1 See "New federal strike-settlement agency is proposed at Arden House conference,"
BNA Daily Labor Report, Oct. 28, 1966, pp. 8-9; "UAW wants new deal on T-H stop-
strike orders," BNA Daily Labor Report, Oct. 20, 1966, pp. 4-5; "Labor Laws: Time for
a change ... 2" Business Week, Dec. 3, 1966, p. 91; "What a new anti-strike law will
be like," U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 28, 1966, pp. 80-81.
2 See 112 Cong. Rec. 22355-61 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1966) (Ripon Society Paper);
"Final report of the ad hoc committee to study national emergency disputes," A.B.A.
Labor Law Book, Aug. 1966, pp. 318-88; "President of airline involved in 1966 strike
suggests changes in labor law," BNA Daily Labor Report, Dec. 6, 1966, pp. 11-12; "Is the
labor board biased?" U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 28, 1966, pp. 72-80; The Kiplinger
Washington Letter, Nov. 11, 1966, p. 1.
3 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964)).
4 Booker & Coe, The NLRB and Its Critics, 17 Lab. L.J. 522, 523 (1966).
5 Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (amended by 73
Stat. 519 (1959), 29 ,U.S.C. 1§ 141-87 (1964)).
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championed by industry as a necessary reform in the late 1940's° and
damned by union leaders for a decade after as anti-labor legislation.'
Few, if any, have stopped to ponder the studied silence of those who
once cried so loudly for Taft-Hartley repeal, but who later largely
abandoned such tactics as a result of the Supreme Court's 1959 decision
in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman,' which interpreted the
existing law as giving the NLRB almost exclusive jurisdiction in labor
matters vis-à-vis the states. Nor have casual observers in this field
given much consideration to the basic democratic reforms embodied in
the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act amendments,' which for a time elicited
the same pained reaction from labor's side." But unquestionably more
and more lawyers, as well as members of the informed public, have
begun to question the efficacy of all the various federal labor statutes
to meaningfully deal with the serious problems forcing themselves on
public attention in a period of unparalleled national economic expan-
sion."
I. NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKES
Some of the developments in the labor-management area which
are forcing a rethinking as to the adequacy of present statutory regu-
lation can be simply listed. In early 1966, a twelve-day strike virtually
eliminated the economic life of the nation's largest city, New York,
when the Transport Workers and Transit Union defied a court order
and refused to return to work until they had reached agreement on a
contract providing for a fifteen per cent wage increase. Later on in the
spring, the AFL-CIO Machinists Union struck five major American
airlines after rejecting the recommendations of a Presidential Emer-
gency Board established under the provisions of the Railway Labor
Act. When the President himself intervened to force a tentative
settlement, it was quickly rejected at the hands of the adamant "rank
and file," and the dispute went on for six weeks before it ended in a
6 See Developments in the Law—The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 781
(1951) ; Note, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 641 (1951).
7 See, e.g., Spielman, The Taft-Hartley Law: Its Effect on the Growth of the Labor
Movement, 13 Lab. L.J. 287 (1962).
8 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Court said, in part, that "when an activity is arguably
subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to
the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state
interference with national policy is to be averted." Id. at 245. This holding effectively
preempted the great majority of labor-management cases to the exclusive area of NLRB
"competence" and jurisdiction.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
19 See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 851 (1960).
11 The American Bar Association's special committee charged with recommending
solutions to national emergency strikes in the field of transportation is one of many
manifestations of such concern.
736
CONGRESSIONAL LABOR AGENDA
guidepost-smashing settlement which included three five-per-cent pay
increases, greater fringe benefits, and a cost-of-living escalator clause.
The plight of millions of stranded travelers moved Senator Morse
(D-Ore.) to say that "voluntary cooperation has been a key element
in maintaining our price-cost stability, and effectively so when every-
one accepts his responsibility. But if a small group pulls a holdup on
the entire Nation, the rules of the game are destroyed."'
Nor are these isolated cases. As this article goes to press, a rail-
road strike has just been postponed by a special congressional resolu-
tion, a strike of network television performers and a lockout by most
of the Nation's truckers have just ended, and the President has in-
voked the Taft-Hartley Law to enjoin a strike at a Connecticut de-
fense plant.
Perhaps major inconveniences, such as transportation disputes
that bottle up a major urban area or effectively shut down much of
the country's national and international air travel, are the inevitable,
unpleasant side effects of a freely functioning collective-bargaining
system. But, since the federal government has already greatly involved
itself in this area, it is certainly arguable that it is the government's
duty, as an "honest broker," to provide a more adequate means than
presently exists for equitably settling labor-management disputes with-
out serious injury to the public or to the national interest. For, ad-
mitting the need to preserve as far as possible labor's basic economic
weapon—the right to strike—and admitting the all but total disinclina-
tion by all parties to resort to compulsory arbitration, there yet
unquestionably appears to be little alternative to limiting the one or
adopting the other unless some better solution is found for the problem
of strikes disruptive of the public interest.
As if reflecting a consensus in favor of some statutory revision,
President Johnson, in his 1966 State of the Union message, asked
Congress to consider legislation to deal with strikes "which threaten
irreparable damage to the national interest.' But with the uncertain-
ties of an election year apparently weighing heavily with the President,
no concrete proposals were forthcoming from the White House."
President Johnson's request did however, trigger the introduc-
tion of a large number of bills in both Houses of the 89th Congress; 15
12 112 Cong. Rec. 16506 (daily ed. July 27, 1966).
13 112 Cong. Rec. — (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1966).
14 One Congressman, at the height of the airlines strike, summed up the President's
role by saying that "he has done nothing and there is no indication that he will do
anything." 112 Cong. Rec. 16440 (daily ed. July 27, 1966) (remarks of Congressman
Gurney).
15 E.g., Senator Smathers' bill, S. 2891, and Senator Griffin's bill, S. 3631, creating
a Labor Court; Senator Javits' bill, S. 2797, providing for seizure of struck companies;
Senator McClellan's bill, S. 10, subjecting unions to the antitrust laws; Senator
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but the most concrete result of this activity was a single, spasmodic
effort to reach a solution to a particularly pressing dispute. This effort
occurred when Congress reluctantly came within inches of adopting a
resolution that would have forced the striking airline machinists back
to work for a period of up to 180 days." When this piecemeal method
of providing strike legislation received heavy criticism, no further
efforts were made during the session to extend Congress' one effort
by coming up with a measure applicable to all circumstances. Then,
in late November, the President made it known that he had created a
task force to study the problem, and that additional studies by both
the Labor and Justice Departments had also been undertaken." Shortly
thereafter, the Department of Commerce announced plans to study
the impact of certain work stoppages on various population groups?'
Paradoxically, the President's State of the Union address the following
month completely omitted any mention of national emergency strikes,
leaving the problem, it would seem, squarely in the lap of Congress. 1 °
Congress has faced the problem before. One solution which was
enacted was the "cooling off" period and the mediation provisions of
the Taft-Hartley Act.' It is now twenty years since these provisions
were adopted. Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, 21 enacted in 1926,
also provides for a "cooling off" period and for the creation of an
Emergency Board to deal with transportation disputes which threaten
to interrupt interstate commerce so as to deprive any section of the
country of essential service. This public remedy has been available
twice as long as the comparable Taft-Hartley sections. Few would
contend that either of these provisions has been completely effective
in dealing with the type of strike situation they aim at correcting.
Nor is this so remarkable. Obviously, significant changes in the
industrial development of the nation have occurred since 1926, or
even 1947. Approximately seventy billion dollars is now spent annu-
ally on national defense production. The demand for essential services
in a growing urban society has mushroomed. Whole industries often
bargain as a single unit with a large coalition of labor unions. Where
Lausche's bill, S. 3587, providing for compulsory arbitration in essential industries. See
also H.R. 333, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (proposal to outlaw joint bargaining),
16 S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Settlement of the strike occurred as the
bill was favorably reported by the House Commerce Committee, after having been passed
by the Senate on August 4, 1966. Many Committee members were reportedly fearful
that such an ad hoc congressional approach to serious strikes would set a precedent and
encourage unions and management in other industries to turn to the government to
resolve all disputes. BNA Daily Labor Report, Aug. 12, 1966, p. 1.
12 BNA Daily Labor Report, Nov. 30, 1966, p. AA-1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1966,
P. 1 .
18 BNA Daily Labor Report, Dec. 1, 1966, p. 7.
10 See 113 Cong. Rec. H-25 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1967).
20 61 Stat. 152 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. II 171-82 (1964).
21 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. 	 160 (1964).
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once many strikes could be largely tolerated or ignored, nearly all in-
dustrial warfare is today considered by most of the public not only
a wasteful vestige of the past but, in many cases, a collective injustice
to the increasingly large number of Americans affected. Unfortunately,
no clear-cut remedy recommends itself.
Suggested solutions run the gamut from compulsory plant seizure,
to arbitration, to revision of the antitrust laws.' In the face of such a
variety of remedies, none of which is completely acceptable to both
management and labor, there is an understandable hesitancy in sub-
mitting yet another proposal that will only arguably help settle the
vexing dilemma of national emergency strikes. But, as it seems proba-
ble that congressional inaction on the subject cannot long be assumed,
perhaps a concrete suggestion on which both sides, and certainly the
public, might grudgingly agree would be in order.
There is no question but that an antitrust approach is antedilu-
vian, and that its more sophisticated offshoots, involving the limita-
tion of combinations of employers or employees for bargaining
purposes to a particular percentage, unit, company, or industry, are
artificial barriers that not only may be structurally wrong for a par-
ticular type of industrial production, but would be anathematized by
the unions—and rightly so. Likewise, efforts to legitimatize resort to
plant seizure intrude the government squarely into the collective-
bargaining picture, and, regardless of the counter-arguments—that
collection of union dues or preservation of the status quo would have
some impact on unions as well as on management—there is little
question that government operation of a business must of necessity
force an employer to eventually accede to very nearly all union de-
mands in order to get his property back. Surely this functional
crudity is an equal to the antitrust concept in its one-sided approach
to the problem.
Union supporters, with few exceptions, would favor seizure as a
political remedy, much as they applauded the action of President
Truman in the "steel seizure" episode of 1952.23
 Management ad-
herents, while approving generally of the antitrust approach, would
obviously resist the granting of seizure powers to the President. Com-
ing one step closer to middle-ground solutions, both sides would and
do oppose any form of compulsory arbitration. The argument has
been frequently made,' but is nonetheless true, that if this power
of compulsion resides in the President, or a board appointed by him,
whatever incentive either side has to reach agreement will be taken
22 See note 15 supra.
23 See the United Steelworkers' amicus curiae brief filed by Arthur Goldberg in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 59 (1952).
24 See, e.g., Gregory, Labor and the Law 386 (1946).
739
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
away, and in its place will be substituted an unvarying reliance on the
centralized authority. Labor and management would not be responsible
for the resulting contract; would be free to criticize the agreement;
might, perhaps, fail to honor it; and the collective-bargaining process
would begin a sharp decline. At the same time, governmental involve-
ment in industrial affairs would sharply increase with the establishment
of this unhappy precedent. The solution of compulsory arbitration
by governmental panel or official, therefore, leaves much to be desired.
Since free collective bargaining is the cornerstone of labor-management
relations and the ideal defended by many over a long period of years,
it would seem appropriate to avoid resort to outside contract dictation
by third parties if any other method of solving emergency disputes
is available.
Thus, coming one step closer to a viable compromise solution,
one confronts President Kennedy's suggestion that the chief execu-
tive be given an "arsenal of weapons" to deal with national emergency
strikes, and that among these would be the power of fact-finding
commissions to make recommendations and the option to use injunc-
tions.' Here, it is submitted, Congress and the commentators are
closest to the area of reality—not only in regard to what would be
politically acceptable to both sides, but also as to what might work
better than the existing statutory provisions. At present, under Taft-
Hartley, the President, if he determines that a threatened or actual
strike imperils the national health or safety, may appoint a fact-finding
board to investigate the issues and submit a written report without
recommendations, which is then publicized. 2° He may next authorize
the Attorney General to seek an eighty-day injunction against the
strike. The granting of such an order lies within the discretion
of the court as to whether the actual or threatened dispute poses a
grave danger to the nation's well-being.' During the injunction period,
the parties are directed to resume bargaining negotiations, and the
operation of the business continues. At the expiration of sixty days,
if the dispute remains unsettled, the same board of inquiry reports
to the President the current position of the parties and the efforts
that have been made to settle the issues, including the employer's last
offer. 28 Within fifteen days, a secret ballot of the employees is taken
on this last offer. Within the final five days after the vote is taken, the
results are certified to the Attorney General, and he then moves to
25 These recommendations were first made during the now famous Kennedy-Nixon
debates in the fall of 1960.
26 LMRA § 206, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1964).
27 LMRA § 208, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1964).
28 LMRA § 209, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 179 (1964).
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dissolve the injunction.' The parties are back to their initial adverse
positions, and a serious strike may take place.
Although the President may report to Congress on the nature of
the dispute, including the contentions of the respective sides and his
recommendations for settlement, such a step ordinarily will have little
effect. As evidenced by the congressional handling of last year's
airline strike—where, incidentally, an emergency board created under
the Railway Labor Act had initially made sensible recommendations
that were for the most part ignored 30—the deliberate manner common
to a legislative body is ill suited to the settlement of emergency dis-
putes. Congress might better provide extra authority to the President
when faced by automatic dissolution of the district court's order at
the expiration of an eighty-day period. In place of the presently
controlling directives of Sections 209 and 210 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
power should be given the President to petition for an extension of the
injunction for thirty days, during which time detailed recommenda-
tions would be made by the emergency board as to the most equitable
terms on which agreement might be reached. If one side or the other
refused at the end of the 110 days to abide by the Board's recom-
mendations for settlement, the President would then be empowered,
at his discretion and after weighing the needs of the country and the
wisdom of allowing unregulated economic warfare to proceed, to
either petition that the injunction be continued until settlement, or to
direct that the Attorney General move to dissolve the existing order.
Similar changes would also be made in Section 10 of the Railway
Labor Act to make the two laws identical in their treatment of emer-
gency work stoppages.
These amendments, it is submitted, would place additional pres-
sure on the parties to the dispute to settle—especially when the
President, and through him the public, is in a position to evaluate
which side, according to the neutral board of inquiry, was recalcitrant
in agreeing to reasonable terms. They would also allow the President
to act against the side that engages in foot dragging—by dissolving
the injunction and allowing the union to strike if its economically
justified claims are not met, or by enjoining the strike until agree-
ment is reached if the merits of the argument favor the employer's
final offer. Judicial review would, of course, be preserved to check
any excessive presidential application of the ultimate injunction remedy
—a remedy that would presumably be resorted to only in national-
interest disputes of a particularly serious nature.
In addition to these increases in the President's power to control
29 LMRA § 210, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 180 (1964).
3° See BNA Daily Labor Report, Aug. 3, 1966, § B.
741
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
disruptive labor disputes, there should be an extension in the basic
coverage of federal antistrike legislation to control disputes which,
although localized to specific state or urban areas, may nonetheless
represent emergencies of the most serious sort. One need but recall
the New York subway strike of 1966, or the more recent Wilmington,
Delaware half-year public transportation tie-up, to sense the gravity
of certain labor problems to local communities. A new section 211
should be added to the Taft-Hartley Act which would allow the Presi-
dent, at the written request of the chief executive officer of a state or
municipality beset by a labor crisis that threatened local health, safety,
or basic public services, to invoke the provisions outlined in amended
sections 206-10. 31
Admittedly, such a change further impinges on, and regrettably
so, an already weakened assumption that state and local authorities
are best able to handle local problems. But with the rise of a strong
national labor policy, as evidenced by the preemptive thrust of Garmon,
and with the growing importance of localized strikes that ultimately
involve a number of political jurisdictions and their people, a strong
argument is already present for extending this federal remedy to
an obvious need. And since the always interested, frequently involved,
third party in every significant labor dispute—the public—would be
represented in any appeal to the President by its principal locally
elected official, the democratic control inherent in the power of the
vote would be, in all likelihood, a sufficient check on over-hasty
requests by local mayors or governors for federal intervention. In
addition, Congress might easily make clear that this procedure ought
to be used only under circumstances where no other course of action
would suffice. With this limitation clearly before them, American
cities, states, and the nation as a whole, might avoid the dangers of
inflicting paralyzing injury on themselves as a result of blind deference
to the principle of untrammeled collective bargaining. If the supremacy
of the public's interest, superior to that of either disputant, is kept
firmly in mind, then the suggested changes in the national-emergency
procedures would appear to be well justified.'
21 A plan to have Congress control local labor disputes does, of course, raise serious
constitutional questions. It would appear, however, that even localized disputes might
have such a significant effect on interstate commerce that Congress could regulate them
if it chose to do so. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
32 One very sound way to approach a solution to the emergency-strike problem
would be the method embodied in a proposal by Senator Robert Griffin (R-Mich.), intro
duced in July 1966, which would have created a joint congressional committee to:
. . . study and investigate the entire field of industry wide and regional collec-
tive bargaining procedures and practices between employers and labor organiza-
tions, and combinations or groups thereof, and problems relating thereto, in-
cluding but not limited to
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II. AUTHORIZATION CARDS AND REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
The most immediate and often-raised complaint concerning the
National Labor Relations Act, or, more precisely, its present interpreta-
tion by the Labor Board, involves the status of union authorization
cards.' In 1947, Congress amended section 9 of the act to provide that:
(c) (1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in




 by an employer, alleging that one or more
individuals or labor organizations have presented to
him a claim to be recognized as the representative
defined in section 9(a);
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reason-
able cause to believe that a question of representation affecting
commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon
(1) the ways and means by which the collective bargaining process might
be improved, altered, revised, or supplemented so as to avoid or minimize strikes
and lockouts which affect an entire industry or region, or a substantial part
thereof ;
(2) the concentration of economic and other power under the control of
business organizations and labor organizations, and groups thereof, and such
practices or policies, if any, which tend to concentrate or monopolize power
affecting the collective bargaining process, and the relationship of such factors
to strikes and lockouts affecting an entire industry or region, or a substantial
portion thereof ;
(3) the effectiveness and usefulness of various forms of mediation, con-
ciliation, arbitration, and other possible procedures and methods for aiding
or supplementing the collective bargaining process;
(4) the administration, operation and possible need for revision of existing
Federal laws which in any way concern collective bargaining, strikes, or lockouts
affecting an entire industry or region, or substantial portion thereof ;
(5) such other problems and subjects which relate in any way to
collective bargaining, strikes or lockouts as the joint committee deems appro-
priate.
S.J. Res. 174, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
Clearly, this legislative formula portends the best chance for successful amendment
of Taft-Hartley of any legislative scheme so far brought forward. The idea of a broad-
based study of the problems inherent in modern collective bargaining, with a view to
revising the existing statutes and thereby hopefully avoiding major strikes and lockouts,
although discussed and applauded by some commentators, has never been given the
congressional authorization it deserves. Senator Griffin's proposal establishes a forum
where union and management spokesmen, as well as other qualified experts, might make
various positions clear and indicate, by way of a balanced presentation, their suggestions
for proposed reform. Public officials, such as mayors and representatives of civic associa-
tions, might also testify. Thus, an extensive, unbiased study of the public's interest as
affected by specific industry labor-management activities might be accomplished without
the pressure to deal immediately with a pending national strike. Such a reflective ap-
praisal by Congress is long overdue.
33 See, e.g., Lewis, The NLRB Again Stretches Joy Silk's Tenuous Fabric, 18 Lab.
L.J. 222 (1967).
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due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or
employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recom-
mendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the
record of such hearing that such a question of representation
exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall
certify the results thereof. (Emphasis added.)
Since Congress specified no other way of obtaining bargaining status,
the method of determining the presence or absence of a union majority
in a particular unit thus appeared to be clearly demarcated. Then, in
Joy Silk Mills, Inc.,' the Board directed an employer who had pur-
posely set out to destroy a union's majority status to bargain with the
union as majority representative, regardless of the union's subsequent
loss of that majority. The principle enunciated seemed to be that an
employer might not always insist on a Board election as the exclusive
basis of determining a question of representation when he had no
good-faith doubt of the union's majority in an appropriate bargaining
unit. It appeared clearly unreasonable to allow an employer to refuse
to bargain with a union without an election when the employer himself
rejected the principle of collective bargaining and desired only to gain
time within which to undermine the union and dissipate its majority.
Thereafter, the Board and the courts generally found a section 8(a) (5)
violation (refusal to bargain), and included a bargaining order as an
appropriate remedy, when an employer refused to recognize a union
with a majority of cards and subsequently engaged in section 8(a) (1)
or 8(a) (3) violations."
From this position, the Board has taken the far-from-inevitable
step of holding that employer bad faith can exist, and therefore that
an 8(a) (5) refusal-to-bargain finding should lie, when no independent
unfair labor practices have been committed. In Snow v. NLRB," the
union obtained a card majority and asked for recognition. The employer
agreed to abide by a card check conducted by a minister, but when the
count indicated a union majority, the employer, unconvinced, demanded
an election. The justification for the bargaining order is not so clear
here as in Joy Silk Mills, but a bad-faith fact situation still seems to
exist.37 However, not every unit presenting a majority of signed cards
to an employer represents at that time 51% of a company's employees.
34 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Qr. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 914 (1951).
35 See Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1962);
NLRB v. Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., 229 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Pyne
Moulding Corp., 226 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Geigy Co., 221 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1954).
36 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962), enforcing 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
n See also NLRB v. Kellogg's Inc., 347 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Hyde, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. George Groh & Sons, 329 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1964); Jem Mfg. Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 61 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1966).
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And it is in this area, with card checks as a substitute for an election,
that the NLRB in the past few years has worked out a rationale of
somewhat dubious merit. One commentator has viewed the development
this way:
The political climate changed; so did the composition
of the Board. Unfortunately, as the composition of the Board
changed, so did its interpretation of the law. Under its current
rule, as set forth in Cumberland Shoe Corp., 381 the Board will
count cards signed by an employee even though it was
procured through the misrepresentation that the card would
be used to obtain an election, or even though the card states
in bold type "I want an election now."E"I
The Board under Cumberland, now holds that there is
but one misrepresentation that will invalidate a card: a state-
ment by a union organizer that the only purpose of the card
is to obtain an election:"
A management attorney has stated that "the Board treats authori-
zation cards as a 'yes' vote in a secret ballot election. They are not the
same. . . ."41 This would rather clearly appear to be the case. While
union organizers cannot demand recognition on the basis of cards
which do nothing more than request an election," they can and do
include this request on cards that also designate the union as bargaining
agent for the person signing them. Frequently, the signer may not
realize this aspect of his authorization. Thus the "dual purpose" card is
used to show a majority and to avoid an election, when its purpose,
in the mind of the worker signing the card, may have been to obtain an
election. This state of mind on the part of employees is considered
irrelevant by the present Board.' But the duality of function these
cards serve indicates the inappropriateness of such a rule. As the First
Circuit said recently, "An employee might sign such a card in order
to be a good fellow, or because it was hard to resist ... an appeal, but
secretly plan to vote against the union. Such a card might be signed
more readily than an unconditional request for membership."'" Aside
from the contradictory motives given by the court for signing a card,
employees may be unclear of purpose," unable to read," or may in
38 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
39 S.N.C. Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 809 (1964) (footnote from quotation).
40 Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union
Majority, 16 Lab. L.J. 434, 437 (1965).
41 RNA Daily Labor Report, Dec. 14, 1966, p. 3.
42 Morris & Associates, 138 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1164-65 (1962); Bannon Mills, Inc 146
N.L.R.B. 611, 612 (1964) (dictum).
43 Acro Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1290 (1964).
44 NLRB v. Freeport Marble & Tile Co., 367 F.2d 371, 372 (1st Cir. 1966).
45 See Jas. E. Matthews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 432, 437 (8th Cir. 1965).
46 See id. at 436.
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fact have their signatures forged.' With misrepresentation of a card's
function frequently occurring, the courts have generally refused to
accept the Board's "only purpose" rule, which practically equates
use of cards with a secret election, and have found cards inconclusive
as to union authorization."
Another valid objection to reliance on cards as an indicator of
the union's majority status is that of ten those who have signed are
outside what might be considered an appropriate bargaining unit. Not
uncommonly, the Board defines a unit for bargaining that later fails
to measure up to more objective standards of appropriateness." The
Fourth Circuit recently commented on the inadequacy of the NLRB's
use of an employee list which included a category of worker that the
union itself conceded ought not to be included in the unit:
Actually, an employer commits an unfair labor practice if he
recognizes a minority union. . . . In the instant case there
was no proof that the union ever obtained the required
majority status .... [A] concession, this time by the General
Counsel, makes this fact crystal clear. While the General
Counsel introduced evidence of majority support for the union
in the company's total work force ... , he conceded that the
company's payroll on that date included an undetermined
number of "drifters" whose exclusion from the bargaining
unit was established in the representation case." (Emphasis
in original.)
In NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc.?' the First Circuit not only
disagreed with the Board's unit determination, but even cast doubt on
the integrity of the fact-finding process used:
As we have said, . . . if its summary was thought to be, as it
was said to be, a statement of "the relevant facts," it certainly
was not. If it was a singling out of those particular facts
which, in the Board's opinion, justified treating the Peabody
store as a single unit, some of them were so expressed, or
limited, as to give the wrong impression . . . ; some of them
were at least materially incomplete ... ; and some almost
totally insignificant. . . . Furthermore, to isolate some facts
and omit others, some of them at least comparable, and some
47 See "The Union Cards Were Phony," Nations Business, March 1966, p. 100,
48 See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 907-08 (D.C. Cir.
1966) ; NLRB v. Peterson Bros., 342 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1965).
49 See generally Rains, Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit by the
NLRB: A Lack of Objectivity Perceived, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 175 (1967).
50 Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 1966).
51 354 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1965).
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of seemingly much greater importance than some mentioned,
is, per se, a failure to view even the recited facts in context."
To the skeptical, the Board would still appear to be somewhat
unreconstructed. In Quality Mkts., Inc.," the examiner had fash-
ioned an extremely favorable remedy for a union attempting to organize
an employer found guilty of violating section 8 (a) (1). But because
the union never obtained a majority of cards, there was no finding
of a violation of section 8 (a) (5). The Board, however, cut the size of
the unit and then counted cards the trial examiner had rejected. It
thus arrived at a majority and proceeded to hold that the company's
refusal to recognize the union was not based on a good-faith doubt
of this majority. The Board ordered the company to bargain with the
union—even though its own trial examiner had exhibited the same
doubts as the company. Then, as if to substantiate the view that it felt
that an employer could not be correct in denying the appropriateness
of a bargaining unit, the Board indicated in another case last year that
a good-faith doubt as to the appropriateness of a unit would not
constitute an independent defense to a refusal-to-bargain charge."
What, then, can a doubting employer who seeks an election do to
establish good faith? The answer is not simple. The Board has travelled
a long way from Joy Silk Mills. It is true that in John P. Serpa, Inc.'
the Board held that, in a refusal-to-bargain case based on the showing
of authorization cards, the General Counsel had the burden of proving
not only that a majority of employees in the appropriate unit had signed
cards designating the union as bargaining representative, but also that
the employer in bad faith had declined to recognize and bargain with
the union. But the Board has inferred bad faith from an employer's
incomplete response in the face of a union demand for recognition,"
from an attempt by an employer to determine if the union did in fact
possess a majority by interrogating his employees in violation of section
8 (a) (1)," and from an employer's commencement and later dis-
52 Id. at 930-31.
ns 160 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 62 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1966).
54 Oklahoma Sheraton Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 61 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1966)
(semble). Cf. H. & W. Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 63 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1966)
(Good-faith doubt that LMRA is applicable to him does not excuse employer's refusal
to bargain.).
" 5 155 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 60 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1965). Accord, Ben Duthler, Inc., 157
N.L.R.B. No. 3, 61 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1966). But cf. U.S. Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B.
No. 60, 61 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1966) (Burden is on employer to show belief in lack of
majority if union has once been certified.).
50 Henry Spen & Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 138 (1964). See Jas. E. Matthews & Co. v.
NLRB, supra note 45, at 439.
57 Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 774 (1964), enforcement denied, 344
F2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965). The courts have attempted to establish criteria for judging
the coerciveness of employer interrogations. Factors to be considered include the labor-
relations history, the nature of the information sought, the identity of the questioner,
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continuance of negotiations (due to conflicting advice of counsel)."
On the other hand, the Board found no violation when the employer
simply refused to look at the cards," or rejected cards signed by a
majority without giving any reason except his desire for an election."
It is likely that with some skillful reasoning, these apparently
inconsistent rulings can be harmonized." But a very real doubt persists
as to whether the Board's policy of inferring bad faith from the legal
activities of employers can ever be called correct. It is submitted that
it is both incorrect and inequitable especially to the small employer
not blessed with retained counsel guiding him through the labyrinth
of NLRB good-faith requirements. A solution must be found which will
safeguard the employees' right to organize and to bargain collectively
and, at the same time, permit even small employers to act with reason-
able assurance that they will not become involved in unfair-labor-
practice proceedings. This is particularly important in view of recent
developments which indicate that refusal-to-bargain charges involving
authorization cards will arise more and more frequently.
It had long been the law that when a union believed an employer
was acting in bad faith by refusing to bargain despite a showing of
authorization cards, it could either file an 8(a) (5) charge or proceed
to an election to determine its majority." In accordance with its present
short-cut approach in the representation-case area, the NLRB held in
1964 that a union which proceeds to an election is not precluded,
should it lose, from thereafter filing a charge based on an employer's
allegedly unlawful failure to acknowledge that the union held a
majority of cards prior to the election." With such an attractive op-
portunity, any union would be foolish, regardless of its actual number
the place and method of interrogation, and the truthfulness of the reply. NLRB v.
Comco, 340 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1965); Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.
1964). The Board may conform to this procedure. See Cannon Elec. Co., 151 N.L.R.B.
1465, 1470-71 (1965).
58 Jem Mfg. Co., supra note 37.
50 Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 61 L.R.R.M. 1230 (1966).
" Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966). The concurring
opinions of Board members Jenkins and Zagoria indicate how muddied the waters have
become and how complicated is the present body of NLRB-made law.
91 See, e.g., 1965-1966 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 909, 941 (1966).
412 Benjamin Aiello, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954).
63 Bernd Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). Accord, Irving Air Chute
Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964). The Board will also order bargaining as a remedy for
other unfair labor practices, if it is clear that the union represented a majority of em-
ployees when they occurred and that the majority has been dissipated. See Better Val-U
Stores, 161 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 63 L.R.R.M. 1326 (1966); Northwest Eng'r Co., 158
N.L.R.B. No. 48, 62 L.R.R.M. 1089 (1966). For the next inevitable step, see the trial




of adherents, not to file a charge of employer bad faith after losing an
election.
Clearly, reliance on good faith, bad faith, shifting burdens of proof
and changing interpretations of the law are less than satisfactory
approaches to the important question of whether or not a union should
represent a group of employees. The paramount consideration should
rather be the freely expressed desire of these employees, independent
of coercion from employer, union, or partisan NLRB zeal. To achieve
this end, Congress ought to amend the present law by making explicit
that a union shall be certified as collective-bargaining representative
only after an NLRB election, unless the employer refuses to bargain
with a union which possesses a majority of cards and then engages in
a course of violations tending to undermine the uncoerced majority
of the union. Such an approach would hopefully preserve the sensible
protection inherent in Joy Silk Mills without sanctioning either the
present extensive use of cards as a substitute for secret elections or the
speculative rationalizing of the Board."
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A topic that may become a matrix of expanding significance in
the years to come deals with the area of free speech. Prior to passage
of the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, management statements
to employees, especially during organizing campaigns or contract
negotiations, were highly suspect in the eyes of the NLRB. The Board
even went to the extent of finding that speeches to employees by their
employer about union membership were always coercive if delivered
01 Sen. Javits (R-N.Y.) introduced a bill (S. 3452) last year which would protect an
employer from unfair-labor-practice charges based on a showing of cards if he complied
with the following proviso which was to be added to § 9(c):
(6) In any case in which it is alleged in a petition filed by an employer
pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) [of § 9(c)] that a labor organization seeking
recognition as the representative of the employees of such employer has
presented valid cards or other unimpeached evidence purporting to show that
a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit desires to be
represented by such labor organization, it shall be the duty of the Board, if it
determines that in all other respects a question of representation affecting com-
merce exists, to forthwith, without regard to the provisions of paragraph (1),
direct the holding of such an election in such unit as the Board finds to be
appropriate and to certify the results thereof. The consideration of the peti-
tion and the holding of the election, in any case, shall not be delayed by reason
of the pendency of an unfair labor practice charge based upon the refusal of
the employer to bargain collectively with the labor organization, and no such
unfair labor practice charge based upon a refusal to bargain prior to the
election shall thereafter be considered unless the Board determines that the
labor organization had once been authorized to represent a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit, but that as a result of a course of conduct by
the employer in violation of section 8(a) (other than unfair labor practices
under section 8(a)(5)), such labor organization is no longer authorized to
represent such majority . . . .
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in the plant during working hours." Perhaps such an agency posture
was historically necessary, or at least excusable, as an aid to struggling
unions attempting to gain a foothold in the American worker's con-
sciousness. But in 1947, apparently deciding that the time had come
to balance the scales a bit, Congress provided in Section 8(c) of the
Taft-Hartley Act that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.
It would appear that, after twenty years, it is again time to take a look
at this frequently forgotten section to determine if additional balancing
may be required.
A. Board Erosion of the Law
Several aspects of the Board's enforcement of the free-speech
proviso have detracted from its effectiveness. Although the Board did,
in response to the new statute, quickly overrule its prohibition of
speeches to employees during working hours," it even more quickly
asserted that the proviso did not apply in representation cases." An
election may be set aside because of wholly noncoercive speeches, even
if the employer does nothing more than say that union representation
will not benefit his employees." As one writer has commented, "The
new Board test seems to be that if any of his [the employer's] com-
munications influence the employees against the union, their total
impact on the results of the election may exceed permissible cam-
paigning."'"
A second factor which has diminished the effectiveness of the free-
speech proviso is the Board's propensity to find coercion in a great
variety of employer activities. Of course, it is obvious that it is the
Board's duty to evaluate the facts, and that subtle and hidden threats
may be just as effective as overt and obvious ones, but consider, in
the light of the preceding discussion of authorization cards and their
unreliability, a recent case. A company official had addressed employees
at a regularly held cafeteria meeting and informed them that two
professional Teamster Union organizers had come to the plant, that
employees might be asked to sign authorization cards, that the company
65 Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
66 Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
67 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
68 See Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962).
69 Cook, Labor, The Baltimore Magazine, Sept. 1966, p. 52.
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had received reports of union harassment to obtain signatures, and
that further efforts at coercion by the union should be promptly
reported. The company official went on to warn: "Be careful about
what you sign—don't sign anything unless you know what you are
signing and what it might mean to you, your family, or your fellow
employees." The talk concluded, "Remember—you do not have to
and should not sign a card under any circumstances, unless you want
the union to be your agent." The NLRB held on these facts that the
employer had threatened his employees and thus violated section
8(a) (1). 7° The Seventh Circuit, not surprisingly, reversed.'
A third factor is the Board's imposition of additional burdens on
employers who exercise their free-speech rights. Despite the proviso,
the Board held, shortly after the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act,
that a noncoercive speech during working hours was an unfair labor
practice if the employer refused to grant a union equal time and
facilities for a reply." In 1953, this procedure was refined to allow
employer speeches without providing the union a forum if the employer
did not have either a broad no-solicitation rule forbidding all union
solicitation on the premises or a rule excessively restrictive for the
character of the business." This seemed a sensible compromise and one
aimed at providing an opportunity for both sides to communicate with
employees, without forcing all employers to periodically turn over
their property and employees' time to the use of the organizing union.
The Supreme Court's view appears to be somewhat more inclined to
allow broad company no-soliciation rules." However, in recent years
the Board has again attempted to utilize these rules as a wedge for
providing organizing unions the right of on-premises response to all
employer speeches."
Finally, the most disturbing agency practice relates to the Board's
holding that noncoercive statements of employers trying to explain,
publicize, and convince employees of the soundness of the company's
position during bargaining negotiations, are an indication of manage-
ment bad faith. The classic case in this instance is General Elec. Co."
Briefly, the case involved communications to employees that were criti-
cal of the union's response to the company's contract offers. The Board
70 Sparton Mfg. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 948 (1965).
77 355 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1966).
72 Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), enforcement denied, 197 F.2d 640
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
73 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
74 See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
n See May Dept Stores, 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d
797 (6th Cir. 1963). But see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889 (6th
Cir. 1965). Compare Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217
(1966).
76 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
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condemned GE's bargaining technique, sometimes referred to as
"Boulwarism," wherein GE, on the basis of its own research and
evaluation of union demands, determined what was "right" for its
employees and then made a "fair and firm" offer to the union without
holding anything back for later trading or compromising. The company
also dealt directly with some local unions and was tardy in turning
over to the national union some information in its possession. The
fascinating part of the case is that the NLRB, in finding the "totality"
of the employer's conduct incompatible with the requirements of section
8(a) (5), relied on what it termed a campaign aimed at "disparaging
and discrediting the statutory representative in the eyes of its employee
constituents.. . ." 77 No mention was made of the truth or falsity of the
employer's statements and, inconceivably, section 8(c) was not once
referred to in the entire case. Such not-so-subtle censorship evoked
the following comment from one writer:
The true reach of the majority opinion . . . condemns
employers who, in engaging in the conduct [under considera-
tion] , create the impression that the employer rather than
the union "is the true protector of the employees' interest."
So bald and partisan an injunction against free speech by an
employer, lest he and his position come to be held by his
employees in higher regard than that of the union, has never
before been enunciated."
The one-sidedness of the Board's decision becomes apparent if
one simply reviews the minutes of the bargaining record and compares
the union representatives' conduct and active "disparagement" of the
company with the condemned employer conduct. There are, of course,
other substantive difficulties with the General Electric case," but the
proscribing of employer communications that truthfully castigate the
conduct of some union leaders, and urge employees to persuade these
leaders to accept a "fair and firm" offer, must rank as a landmark of
heavy-handed decision making." Obviously, every company has a
definite interest in its employees' welfare and conditions of employment,
if for no other reason than whatever affects them affects the business,
for good or ill. Management therefore deems it not only its right, but
also its duty, to speak out on all matters affecting its work force. A
77 Id. at 195. Perhaps the employer's price for freedom of speech is the granting of
concessions to the union. The Board's latest pronouncement on the subject would so
indicate. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 62 L.R.R.M. 1617, 1620
(1966).
78 Benctar, GE—Unique Situation or Broad Impact, 17 Lab. L.J. 160, 163 (1966).
79 See Marcus, The Employer's Duty to Bargain: Counterproposal v. Concession,
17 Lab. L.J. 541, 556-58 ( 1 96 6).
80 Sec also The Stanley Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 734 (1954).
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union's claims and conduct, at the organizing stage or at the bargaining
table, often affect the size of the work force and the future of the enter-
prise. Surely then, employers ought to be allowed broad latitude in
comments to employees respecting their representatives' actions. Those
who do not view the activities of all unions as beyond honest criticism
will consequently find General Electric an unhappy portent of future
limitations on employer-employee communications.'
B. Appeals to Racial Consciousness
A technique which has been employed recently by both employers
and unions is to appeal to the racial identity and emotions of employees.
Such appeals usually are made prior to a representation election, when
both sides struggle to convince employees of the benefits of voting
"yes" or "no." The present NLRB policy is that "an election will
not be set aside if a party limits itself to truthfully setting forth another
party's racial attitudes and policies and does not deliberately seek to
overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory
appeals."" For example, in Sewell Mfg. Co.,' the employer appealed
to his predominantly white employees to vote against the union because
of the union's alleged support of the civil-rights movement. The Board
very correctly set the election aside on the grounds that the employer's
racial propaganda was intentionally designed to inflame racial hatred
and engender a conflict between Negro and white workers. However,
in two later cases, Archer Laundry Co." and Aristocrat Linen Supply
Co.," the interjection of racial issues into an election campaign involved
a predominantly Negro work force and was primarily accomplished
by the union. The Board found this conduct permissible as a concerted
appeal to racial pride and the desire for economic equality.
This rather unusual quasi-tolerance by the Board, involving a type
of conduct that in any other employment context would be highly
suspect," has caused surprisingly little comment. Perhaps this is
because the Board has qualified its latitudinarian view of racial appeals
81 A GE spokesman has remarked that:
underlying the question of employer communication is the basic issue of whether
management's relationship to its employees should be carried on exclusively
through the union, or whether management has an additional responsibility to
present its views directly to employees, once presented to the union. This is no
straw man—there is a viewpoint current that the union should handle everything
for employees.
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1965, p. 10.
82 30 NLRB Ann. Rep. 52 (1965) .
83 138 N.L.R.B. 66, supplemented, 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962).
84 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965).
85 150 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1965).
86 Cf. Title WI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. ii 2000e to e-15,
and Digest of Opinion Letters issued by the Office of the General Counsel, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (1965-66).
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by saying that the burden of proof will rest on the party making use of
such arguments to establish that they are truthful and germane, and
that if a doubt of the propriety of these appeals still remains, it will
be resolved against that party. 87 But despite the protection afforded
by this rule, very real possibilities for abuse remain.
If employees were simply asked to vote for a union because of its
pro-civil-rights posture, there might be a basis for excusing such
statements as permissible election campaign propaganda. But as
inevitably happens, union organizers in attempting to focalize potential
employee dissatisfaction, concentrate on the issues that will most likely
produce a majority in their favor. Quite clearly, the civil-rights struggle
will be of real significance to Negro employees, and, rather than an
attempt at mere identification of the union as a proponent of this
cause, there will be an effort to picture the employer as an enemy of
the race. In Archer, for example, union leaflets stated: "Dogs couldn't
stop us, police brutality couldn't stop us, fire hoses couldn't stop us,"
and, in line with a caricature of a fat, bald-headed man carrying a bag
of money in one hand, a huge barbed club labelled "boss" in the other,
was the legend, "are you going to let your boss stop your" Allowing
the union to engage in this type of conduct must place the target
company or plant, regardless of the enlightened social views held by
the management involved, in the position of being anti-Negro.
Thus, notwithstanding the NLRB dichotomy between race hatred
and race pride, it may be plausibly asserted that those who hear and
read these visceral arguments rarely pause to reflect on such distinc-
tions. Because of the harmful effect on future employer-employee
relations, it is submitted that racial arguments should be left out of
labor relations entirely." In a time when equal employment is being
championed by business and unions alike, it seems anomalous indeed
to allow any one group to utilize vestigial animosities, regardless of the
ultimate purpose. One court of appeals has recently declined to follow
the Board's lead concerning a union's right to expropriate the
enthusiasms of social protest. In NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse;
87 28 NLRB Ann. Rep. 58-59 (1963).
88 150 N.L.R.B. at 1435.
89 A nasty concomitant of allowing a union to utilize race separateness in its
dealings with an employer may be seen in the important recent decision, Local 12,
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). There the Fifth Circuit
condemned a union practice of appealing to the white majority of workers in a
plant by under-representing, or not representing at all, Negro employees who constituted
a minority of the work force. In NLRB v. Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), the same court outlawed a union practice that allocated




Inc., the Fourth Circuit refused to countenance a union's outright
reliance on use of racial feelings as a vehicle for obtaining representa-
tion status." This is surely a preferable approach to that taken by the
Board, and one that Congress might well sanction.
C. A Proposal
A suggested "free speech" amendment to the National Labor
Relations Act should then, in light of the above developments, rearticu-
late the goals of the present section 8(c) and read approximately this
way:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice and shall not constitute grounds for, or be
relevant in any determination involving representation mat-
ters under section 9 or any other provision of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force, or promise
of benefit, or reference, either direct or implied, to the race,
color, religion, sex or national origin of the employer or
employees.
Such a proviso would go far in maintaining a healthy intercourse
of arguments and ideas among union, management, and employees.
Hopefully, it would also remove any artificial or one-sided barriers to
unhindered communications between an employer and his work force,
while at the same time preserving safeguards for the union contesting
for employee loyalties.
No legislative pronouncement can solve every problem. Because
the NLRB interprets and enforces the nation's labor law, its policies
and opinions will always be of great importance, and it would be
difficult, as well as undesirable, to hold too tight a rein on the Board's
actions. The provisions of the present section 8(c) could hardly be
clearer, but the Board's interpretations have weakened and, to an
extent, evaded them. If Congress now, after some years of experience
with the Board's policies, determines that these interpretations must
be modified, the way to do so is not to attempt to further clarify what
is already crystalline, but to reenact section 8(c)—with the proposed
changes—and to ensure that the legislative history of the amendment
clearly shows an intent to afford additional protection for the right of
free speech. If this message does not reach the Board, it must surely
reach the courts.
no 356 F.2d 675, 678-79 (4th Cir. 1966).
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IV. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
A. Runaway Shop
The most significant legal difficulty recently faced by labor unions
has been the vexing problem of the "runaway shop." This problem
also presents the national labor movement with a very strong case to
be made before Congress regarding the need for Taft-Hartley reform.
In Garvin Corp.," the NLRB found that the employer had, without
notice to either union or employees, removed his business operation
from New York to Miami for anti-union rather than economic motives.
It held that the company had violated sections 8(a) (1), (3), and (5),
and ordered, among other things, bargaining with the union as repre-
sentative of the company's new employees in Florida. The rub was that
the Board by its order imposed the union as bargaining agent irrespec-
tive of the new employees' wishes, and thus contrary to the rights
guaranteed them by section 7. Conversely, however, any other remedy
seemed ineffectual. The employer was not about to return to New
York, nor the former employees move to Florida, and the back-pay
remedy to the latter for loss of earnings was insubstantial. Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit felt con-
strained to hold that the freedom of choice of the workers in a bargain-
ing unit could not be disregarded in any pragmatic effort to effectively
punish the guilty employer.'
Congress might well be persuaded by the equities of the case to
specify—perhaps in section 301—an appropriate remedy. This might
include damages for the loss represented by past organizational efforts
or the costs of any new organizing campaign. Not only should Congress
reaffirm a union's status to sue for damages caused by a "runaway"
employer's disavowal of the collective-bargaining agreement, but it
also would do well to determine: (1) the range of compensatory
damages (lost union dues, organizational expenses); (2) their limit
(period of the contract, period subsequent to contract's expiration);
and (3) the advisability of allowing punitive damages."
B. Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses
If Congress were to look at section 301, it could hardly avoid
reviewing the Supreme Court's present interpretation of that section
as it applies to judicial enforcement of agreements not to strike. En-
91 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965).
92 Sub nom. Local 57, ILGWU v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Compare
NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957), with NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293
F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
93 See United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509, 510 (ED.
Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam as modified sub nom. Local 127, United Shoe Workers v.
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962).
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acted in 1947, section 301 was intended by Congress to authorize suits
by employers or unions in the federal courts for violations of labor
agreements, without regard to the amount in controversy or diversity
of citizenship."
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills," the Supreme Court held
that section 301 authorized the federal courts to specifically enforce
employer agreements to arbitrate disputes. But then, in Sinclair Ref.
Co. v. Atkinson," the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act"
prohibited granting specific enforcement of a no-strike clause in a labor
contract. The NLRB meanwhile had held that a strike in breach of a
no-strike clause did not even constitute a refusal to bargain." Thus,
the employer seeking effective redress for union violation of its promise
not to strike is left to seek some type of money damages. But, as Mr.
Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting opinion in Sinclair, "the
enjoining of a strike over an arbitrable grievance may be indispensable
to the effective enforcement of an arbitration scheme in a collective
agreement; thus the power to grant that injunctive remedy may be
essential to the uncrippled performance of the Court's function under
§ 301."" In a footnote, he pointed out that "to hold otherwise would
obviously do violence to accepted principles of traditional contract law.
Even more in point, a contrary view would be completely at odds with
the basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral
process as a substitute for economic warfare.'
Since 1935, it has been the national labor policy to encourage
fidelity to collective agreements by both management and unions,
rather than resort to crippling strikes, picketing, or lockouts. The
Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in 1932 and was aimed at the indis-
criminate use of injunctions by federal judges in an historical context
far removed from that wherein a binding, fairly bargained contract
governs the conduct of both parties. For, where the duties and responsi-
bilities of employer and employees are freely agreed to, the use of a
strike or lockout is not only inappropriate but extreme. It is an act
of massive repudiation of solemn commitments in consideration of
which the other party has agreed to be bound. The no-strike clause is
often the only meaningful promise made by a union in the entire
contract, and, without some means of enforcing it, the employer, who
54 See Givens, Injunctive Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Prohibiting Strikes,
17 Lab. L.J. 292 (1966); Note, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 643 (1963),
55 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
06 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
07 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-14 (1964).
58 Lumber & Sawmill Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 235 (1961), afrd, 319 F.2d 375 (9th
Cir. 1963).
05 370 U.S. at 216.
100 Id. at 217 n.2, quoting from Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
95, 105 (1962).
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has pledged himself to a whole range of wage and fringe benefits for a
fixed period of time, is left by himself on a one-way street. The Sinclair
decision effectively denies the employer the period of labor peace and
stability he has bargained for, thereby depriving him of the fruits of
negotiation. A suit for damages is a poor remedy, being untimely,
costly (because of delay), and often the spawning ground of many
complexities."' Attempts to obtain state court injunctions will either
be met with an action to remove to the federal courts, 102 or will vary in
success depending on the law of the jurisdiction. Therefore, consistent
with a uniform national labor policy and the industrial tranquility it
purports to serve—to say nothing of requiring parties to abide by their
promises—section 301 should be amended to permit judicial enforce-
ment of no-strike, no-picketing, and no-lockout agreements without
regard to the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
C. Fibreboard and Darlington
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated the possibility
of an NLRB program requiring employers to submit to collective
bargaining all decision-making processes by which management directs
and controls the basic operations of a business. Such an approach
could require disclosure when secrecy was a necessity and could involve
the delay of "bargaining to an impasse" when time was vital. Naturally,
such a possibility evoked startled reaction. 103
The first of the two decisions was Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co.
v. NLRB.'" In that case, the Court held that an employer was required
to bargain with the union which represented its maintenance employees
concerning an economically motivated decision to subcontract main-
tenance work, and that the NLRB had authority to order resumption
of the subcontracted work by the maintenance employees and reinstate-
ment with back pay of those displaced. Prior to that time, if economic
factors prompted the subcontracting, there was no unfair labor
practice.lo"
lot See Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions
and Discipline, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 239 (1966). An example of such complexities
might be seen in the General Motors' Mansfield, Ohio strike in February 1967, which
cost the UAW dearly, but involved only an incidental economic setback to GM. See
Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1967, p. I.
102 See 28 U.S.C. $§ 1441-50 (1964),
103 See, e.g., Bart & Kingston, The Specter of Darlington—Restrictions on an
Employer's Right to Make a Change in His Business Operations, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 55 (1966).
104 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
105 See NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954)
(semble). But a discriminatory motive may convert legitimate management actions
into violations, see NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), even if discrimina-
tion is only part of the motive, see Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1963).
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The circumstances of the subcontracting attempted in Fibreboard
exhibit the extreme situation wherein a whole group or unit of em-
ployees is replaced by another group of outside workers to perform
the very same functions in the same plant under the ultimate control
of the same employer. The union had represented the maintenance
employees at the plant for over twenty years. Four days before expira-
tion of an existing contract, the employer informed the union repre-
sentative of its decision to replace these workers and of the futility
of any bargaining over a new contract. Surely here the equities, if not
the law, pointed in the union's favor. Consequently, the Court stated
that it was "not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining'
to hold on such facts that this specific subcontracting was within the
ambit of section 8(d), and that its decision did not "encompass other
forms of 'contracting out' or 'subcontracting' which arise daily in our
complex economy.' >107 Three Justices concurred, but remarked that
"the Court's opinion radiates implications of ... disturbing breadth."'
Fortunately, few of these implications have, as yet, come to pass.
Apparently the Board realized the limitations implied by Fibreboard
and the unwisdom of a total agency immersion in the bargaining process
that a contrary course involved. Accordingly, in Westinghouse Elec.
Corp.,109 it held that an employer is under no duty to notify and bargain
with the union before contracting out work when:
(1) such subcontracting was motivated solely by economic
considerations,
(2) it comported with traditional methods of business opera-
tion,
(3) there was no significant variance in kind or degree from
what had been customary under past established practice,
(4) no demonstrable adverse impact on employees in the unit
was evident, and
(5) the union had the opportunity to bargain about changes
in existing subcontracting practices at general negotiating
meetings.'"
In the period since the Westinghouse decision, the Board has
applied the tests there laid down in a number of cases. ili As a con-
106 379 U.S. at 215.
107 Ibid.
108 Id. at 218 (Stewart, J., with Douglas & Harlan, JJ., concurring).
1o9 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
110 Id. at 1577.
111 E.g., Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1359 (1965); Allied Chem.
Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 718 (1965); Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 332 (1965) ;
Superior Coach Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 188 (1965). See General Tube Co., 151 N.L.R.B.
850 (1965); American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 421 (1965); General Motors Corp., 149
N.L.R.B. 396 (1965), supplemented, 158 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 62 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1966).
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sequence of the approach now taken by the Board concerning the need
to bargain over subcontracting, and its ostensible reliance on a few
specific tests to guide its own decisions as well as those of employers,
it might be expected that the threat initially seen in Fibreboard could
now be disregarded. Unfortunately, a parallel line of cases dealing with
the partial or complete shutdown of a business mitigates against such
optimism.
The leading case relating to plant closures, and the second Supreme
Court decision radiating ominous implications, is Textile Workers v.
Darlington Mfg. Co. 112 There the Board found that the employer
violated both sections 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) of the act by closing his
plant in order to avoid bargaining with a newly certified union. 113
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the employer had an
absolute right to discontinue his business, no matter what the motive.'
The Supreme Court, in effect, split the difference, agreeing with the
lower court that an employer could close his entire business, even if
motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, but holding that any
partial closing would violate section 8 (a) (3) if its purpose were to
"chill unionism."'" The "duty to bargain" aspects of the case were
ignored by the Court, leaving open the question of whether an employer
must negotiate before terminating business operations for an economic
reason. The NLRB for its part continues to interpret section S(a) (5)
to require such negotiations.'" Such an interpretation of the law is
contrary to the view of two courts of appeals that a company need not
bargain over a bona-fide decision to make basic operational changes." 7
It would appear that the NLRB has attempted to superimpose on
the area of plant closures and business terminations the "significant
detriment" or "adverse impact" tests which it applies in subcontracting.
But the closing of a plant or the discontinuance of part of a business
involves entirely different management considerations from those
present in a subcontracting decision. Administrative rules appropriate
in the latter case merely invite obfuscation, delay, and hardened
attitudes in the former. The Board, if pressed, might agree, but now
112 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
113 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 (1962).
114 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963)..
115 380 U.S. at 275. More specifically, a partial closing is an unfair labor practice
under § 8(a) (3) if motivated by a purpose to stifle unionism in any of the remaining
plants or business activities of the single employer, and if the employer may reasonably
have foreseen that such closing was likely to have that effect. Id. at 275-77.
nol See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
117 NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB
v. William J. Burns Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965). See NLRB
v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
But sec NLRB v. Johnson, 368 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. American Mfg.
Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965).
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argues that there really is not much difference between the two manage-
ment actions, and, in any case, that considerations of social value are
paramount in administering the act." Yet, granting the importance
of mitigating, if not altogether eliminating the economic consequences
to employees left without employment when a business is terminated,
how much wiser it would be to require bargaining about the effects
on employees of a closure. On occasion the Board has done this in
the past.' In New York Mirror,120 for example, a unilateral shutdown
was upheld by the Board as consistent with 8(a) (5) when negotiations,
after the employer's action had taken place, were directed to the issue
of employee severance and termination pay. They also involved
employer efforts to secure new positions for those discharged, which
extended to the establishing of an employment office and to the placing
of ads in various publications for available jobs. Such steps by the
employer to alleviate the consequences of the closing were of course
far more meaningful than any NLRB-required predecision "impasse"
bargaining could ever be. Would it not be equally reasonable for Con-
gress to insure some employment security for workers displaced by
discontinuance, sale, or other disposal of a business or plant by amend-
ing section 8(d) to provide for meeting and discussion by management
with union representatives as to the effect of such employer action?
At the same time Congress ought not to require an employer to bargain
collectively before taking any action regarding basic operational
changes in a business.
If both the subcontracting and basic-operational-change problems
are to be governed by the same rules, it would seem preferable to use
the rule just proposed, rather than that presently governing subcon-
tracting. Thus, section 8(d) might be amended to require bargaining
over any decision which would cause a "significant detriment" or "ad-
verse impact" to the bargaining unit, but adding a proviso which would
absolve an employer of any refusal to bargain if he afterwards nego-
tiates with the union regarding the effects of such a change in opera-
119 True it is that decisions of this nature are, by definition, of significance for
the employer. It is equally true, however, and ought not to be lost sight of,
that an employer's decision to make a "major" change in the nature of his
business, such as the termination of a portion thereof, is also of significance
for those employees whose jobs will be lost by the termination. For, just as the
employer has invested capital in the business, so the employee has invested years
of his working life, accumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and
developing skills that may or may not be salable to another employer. And,
just as the employer's interest in the protection of his capital investment is
entitled to consideration in our interpretation of the Act, so too is the employee's
interest in the protection of his livelihood.
Ozark Trailers, Inc., supra note 116, at 1267.
119 Sec Georgia-Pacific Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 885 (1965) ; Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124
N.L.R.B. 494 (1959).
129 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
761
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tions. In this way, labor unions would be given a greater role to play in
insuring and protecting the employment security of their members. At
the same time, employers would be made more clearly aware of the
necessary considerations to be included in economic decision making,
without having to defer such action indefinitely.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding has been an attempt to explore those areas of our
present labor laws that are in need of reevaluation and change. Limita-
tions of space have not permitted an examination of every amendment
which might be desirable at this time, and another writer, while per-
haps agreeing on the need for national-emergency-strike legislation,
might assign different priorities to various other sections of the law
deemed in need of correction.'" Perhaps, for example, a union spokes-
man might deem it most essential to enact legislation curtailing govern-
ment contracts to firms which persistently violate the labor laws. 122
Admittedly, some partisanship is difficult if not impossible for any
commentator on contemporary labor relations to eschew. But it does
seem possible, in proposing statutory improvements, to objectively look
to an overall norm: one that would assign priority to the protection of
the public, then preserve established rights of unions, and yet still
leave employers in a status of coequal. Too often today, when an ad-
ministrative agency adjudicates the propriety of employer or union
conduct, this norm is disregarded. It seems pointless to indulge in a
"chamber-of-horrors" recital of the questionable, sometimes bizarre,
decisions handed down by the NLRB in recent years—one case even
holding that an employer who permitted a penny rise in the cost of a
cup of coffee, without consulting the union first, violated the act.' At
the same time, at least a number of those agency interpretations con-
sidered above stand out as clear-cut examples of significantly inappro-
priate applications of the law. But an appraisal of the Board's point of
view in selected contexts does not necessarily imply that the agency
cannot or will not correctly follow Congress' legislative direction—if it
is redefined and made explicit. This is, of course, the challenge, and
indeed the obligation, of the legislative branch. Hopefully, both will be
soon met.
121 Compare Griffin, The Labor Board and Section 8(b) (7), 40 U. Det. L.J. 212
(1962); Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Need For Federal Injunctions, 114
U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 (1966); Warner, Product Picketing—A New Loophole in Section
8(6)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act? 63 Mich. L. Rev. 682 (1965).
122 See BNA Daily Labor Report, May 25, 1966, p. 1.
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